Abstract. Feature-oriented programming organizes programs around features rather than objects, thus better supporting extensible, product-line architectures. Programming languages increasingly support this style of programming, but programmers get little support from verification tools. Ideally, programmers should be able to verify features independently of each other and use automated compositional reasoning techniques to infer properties of a system from properties of its features. Achieving this requires carefully designed interfaces: they must hold sufficient information to enable compositional verification, yet tools should be able to generate this information automatically because experience indicates programmers cannot or will not provide it manually. We present a model of interfaces that supports automated, compositional, feature-oriented model checking. To demonstrate their utility, we automatically detect the feature-interaction problems originally found manually by Robert Hall in an email suite case study.
Introduction
Modules are crucial to large-scale software construction (Parnas, 1972) . Modules divide a system into coherent collections of data structures and functionality that programmers can assemble into a suite of services. The benefits that modules bestow, such as independent development and code reuse, have ensured the widespread adoption of modules in software development.
Having different developers write the modules in a system increases the likelihood of incompatibility between modules. Programmers therefore need some level of composition verification to protect against latent errors that are not detected until late into development or even deployment. Type checking at module boundaries is perhaps the most basic and widespread form of verification. Each module's interface specifies its services as a series of function or method names and the type signatures on their inputs and outputs; the module also specifies the interfaces it expects of the modules with which it will eventually compose.
Type checkers confirm that an individual module satisfies its own interface and that it uses services from other modules type-correctly. Modern languages such as ML (Milner et al., 1990) and Java (Gosling et al., 1996) support this basic notion of modular verification, and it is so useful and convenient that programmers use it daily without complaint.
While type-based modular verification is a handy first line of defense, it proves only a very simple theorem (typically, that well-typed programs will not go "wrong" (Milner, 1978) ); furthermore, this theorem is fixed and built into the type system. Developers often need to prove richer theorems about a system's behavior. Behavioral verification can uncover subtle errors such as concurrency violations, race conditions, deadlock, and progress failures. As programs grow more complex, and increasingly use communication and concurrency, behavioral verification grows more critical.
The feasibility of modular behavioral verification is unfortunately diminished by a simple but critical practical concern: the need for specifications. While programmers voluntarily write types, decades of experience have shown that programmers are highly unlikely to write more complex specifications of a module's behavior. This problem persists even when these specifications are fed to tools that can provide concrete feedback (Flanagan et al., 2001) . Worse, programmers often simply lack sufficient understanding of the program's behavior and may not have the training necessary to correctly use the specification logics. Without specifications, however, the modular verification tools cannot function, leaving the programmers who most need verification unable to exploit it.
One tempting proposition is to compose a complete program out of the modules, then verify the program as a whole. Verifying the entire program, however, has several shortcomings. First, not all modules are available at the same place, because they are written by independent authors and assembled (in a componential fashion (Szyperski, 1998) ) by a client. Second, even when the modules are available (say at the client), the total number of system configurations can be too numerous: for instance, in a product line construction (Clements and Northrop, 2002) , the total number of combinations of product line features can exhibit combinatorial explosion. Finally, even a single one of those configurations may be too large to verify en masse due to the well-known problem of state explosion .
For behavioral verification to be useful and tractable in practice, it must therefore apply to modules, rather than only to whole programs. Ideally, a modular verification methodology should support proving properties about individual modules and inferring properties of composed systems from properties of the individual modules; furthermore, these methods should retain the automation of type checking. Most importantly, given a behavioral property expected of a whole system, the technique must automatically generate the module specifications because programmers often will not, and sometimes may not be able to, supply them. This is the essence of automated software engineering: to automatically handle tasks that programmers cannot, or will not, perform manually.
The verification technique that this paper defines specifically addresses feature-oriented modules. These modules encapsulate individual program features that cross-cut systems and contain state-machine representations of code fragments that implement a feature's functionality for each actor in the overall system. In recent years, researchers from a variety of applications areas have noted that programming with cross-cutting concerns can simplify a variety of software engineering problems such as maintenance, evolution, and product-line development (Batory and O'Malley, 1992; Clements and Northrop, 2002) . This paper focuses on the interfaces that feature-oriented modules need in order to support modular model checking of behavioral properties. Interfaces must contain sufficient information for tools to prove whether composition would violate the properties proven of an individual module. This requires interfaces to contain constraints, similar to verification conditions, that other modules must satisfy at composition time. Our methodology derives these conditions automatically during feature verification. Thus, for feature-oriented modules we are able to lift the benefits of automated modular verification to the level of behavioral properties.
This paper also demonstrates the utility of our interfaces through a case study, which we use as a running example throughout the paper. The case study is based on an analysis of an email system originally conducted by Robert Hall (2000) . This example is interesting because it contains a substantial number of feature interactions; in our methodology, these manifest as properties that hold of individual features, yet fail after composition. Hall originally identified these interactions manually. Using our methodology, we can detect these interactions automatically and compositionally given desired properties of the individual features.
Section 2 provides an overview of the case study used in this paper. Section 3 presents an overview of and prior work on open systems. Section 4 describes our core approach to feature-oriented verification in the context of closed systems. Section 5 extends our approach to open systems. Section 6 presents the results of our case study. Section 8 reviews related work. Section 9 offers concluding remarks.
A motivating scenario
We illustrate features and their interactions, and use an email application as a case study to show how they lead to open systems. The example we present is originally due to Robert Hall (2000) . The application offers several features, a characteristic of product line systems; these features can, however, adversely interact with one another in many ways. The application provides a database which stores information pertinent to individual users, such as their encryption keys, mail aliases, and forwarding addresses (if any). The application contains the following features (figure 1 shows some of their state machines): basic mail delivery, digital signatures, forwarding, anonymous remailing, encryption, decryption, signature verification, auto-reply, filtering (based on sender's hostname), and mail hosting. The features connect through a pipe-and-filter style architecture (Shaw and Garlan, 1996) .
The following properties, elicited by Hall, should hold of a system containing these features. There are two propositions for sending mail, deliver and received. Deliver indicates a message that reaches the current user, while received indicates a message that was mailed to an external user and reaches the recipient.
The properties are stated both in English and in the temporal logic CTL (Clarke et al., 1986 . CTL formulas describe properties of states of a system. A CTL operator consists of two designators: a path quantifier (A for all paths or E for some path) and a temporal operator (G for all times, F for some future time, U for until, and R for release. Rather than reproduce the formal semantics, we provide four examples of CTL formulas and their English interpretations.
• AFϕ says "on all paths ϕ is true at some future state".
• AGϕ says "on all paths, ϕ is true in all states" (i.e., ϕ is true in all reachable states).
• E[ϕ U ψ] says "there exists a path on which ϕ is true in every state until ψ becomes true" (ψ must be true in some state along the path).
• A[ϕ R ψ] says "on all paths, ψ must continue to hold until ϕ holds (if ϕ never holds, ψ must hold indefinitely)". Release (R) is the dual of until (U).
Hall found a variety of interactions by manually inspecting numerous configurations of these features. Many of these interactions violate straightforward requirements on the individual features; this paper studies ten of these requirements. We state the requirements both informally and in CTL.
1. Once a message is signed, the sender field is not altered until the message is delivered or received. Formula:
2. When a message is ready to be remailed, it is never mailed out with the sender's identity exposed. Each of these properties holds in the feature that implements it. Each property also fails when the feature that implements it is composed with another (specific) feature. Section 6 describes these interactions and the specific aspects of our methodology that detect the failures.
Open systems and prior work
Consider property 4 of the email application, which states that once a message is encrypted, it is never sent out on the network in the clear. This property holds of the encryption feature. If we compose the encryption feature and the forwarding feature, we will need to check that the forwarding feature preserves this property. The standard CTL model checking algorithm (Clarke et al., 1986 ) is potentially unsound in this case, however, because the forwarding feature's state machine does not contain the proposition encrypted. This is not a design error. Encryption is not part of forwarding, so the forwarding feature should not contain references to the message attributes associated with encryption. This separation of concerns, which underlies feature-oriented design, inherently yields verification tasks involving unknown propositions; unknown propositions lead to open systems.
The existing work in open systems addresses two forms of openness: uncertainty in transitions and ignorance of propositions. Kupferman et al. (1998) address the former. Their work considers cases in which properties fail due to the values generated by an environment model; their methodology reports a property true of a system only if that property holds regardless of the environment. The work in modal transition systems, similarly, deals with uncertainty of transitions (Huth et al., 2001) . In contrast, we are concerned with property preservation under specific compositions; most cases of feature interaction arise in contexts where some compositions violate properties and others do not. The Kupferman et al. approach is therefore too restrictive for our work.
Bruns and Godefroid consider propositions whose value is unknown; these propositions arise from partial Kripke structures (Bruns and Godefroid, 1999) . They employ a 3-valued logic to preserve properties of the partial system in the complete structure. Our work differs in the source of the unknown propositions. In their work, the unknown propositions arise from considering only a portion of a full state space. In ours, the unknown propositions arise from the properties that we wish to verify. The features themselves are closed (by construction) but lead to open system considerations when verified against properties containing propositions from other features. Furthermore, their work does not address a compositional methodology or other open system concerns (such as refinement of propositions and distinctions between control and data propositions) that we motivate in this paper. Our methodology does exploit their algorithm for implementing a 3-valued CTL model checker from an existing 2-valued one (Bruns and Godefroid, 2000) . Chechik et al. (2001) multi-valued model checker shares the shortcomings of Bruns and Godefroid's work from the perspective of this work.
The differences between our view of open systems and those in these previous works arise from the models of composition that each work employs. Features encapsulate related portions of a system and compose in a quasi-sequential manner. Open systems in which unknown values arise in the models (rather than from the properties) require another module (the environment) running in parallel to supply the unknown values; Kupferman et al.'s work operates in this context. Bruns and Godefroid's work also appears to assume this because their unknown propositions may change value anywhere within a state space (suggesting that the decision of how and when values change is under the control of an external, simultaneously executing entity). In our work, the unknown propositions arise either from data attributes controlled by other features, or from control variables that are local to other features. These differences force us to develop a new methodology for open system verification.
Recent work by Giannakopoulou et al. (2002) presents a technique that generates interfaces for labeled transition systems. The generated interfaces effectively close the system with respect to given properties. This is similar in spirit to our work, but differs primarily in three respects: their interfaces are labeled transition systems rather than temporal logic formulae; their algorithms assume parallel composition; and while their technique can handle encodings of unknown propositions, it does not natively support our notion of evolving propositions (which we discuss in Section 5.2).
Many researchers have acknowledged the difficulty in detecting feature interactions in the presence of unknown information. Hall classifies several types of interactions; ours fall into his "Type II" classification. Some researchers have related feature interaction detection to the frame problem from artificial intelligence (Astesiano and Reggio, 1998; Au and Atlee, 1997; Blom et al., 1995; Borgida et al., 1995) . Jackson relates the frame problem to views, which are similar in spirit to cross-cuts (Jackson, 1995) . Like Bruns and Godefroid, these techniques all assume a global view of the system, in which all propositions are known in advance. Furthermore, none of their approaches is compositional. Our approach supports the addition of previously unidentified propositions (a higher-level notion of openness) and compositional reasoning.
Modeling and verifying features as closed systems
Our goal is to develop a compositional methodology for verifying features as open systems. One especially beneficial outcome of such a methodology would be the detection of undesirable feature interactions. As an example, anonymous remailing does not mask a sender's identity if the sender key-signed the message. Other interactions arise from the order in which an application executes features. Although forwarding does not inherently affect encryption, if a message is decrypted prior to forwarding, then a message that had been encrypted goes out on the network in the clear. Such feature interactions are a widespread problem in telecommunications and many other applications, even giving rise to a workshop series. In this paper, we view a feature interaction as undesirable if it violates a formal requirement of either an individual feature or the entire system. We do not discuss the problem of extracting these properties from the requirements.
The main challenges in developing such a methodology are determining what information needs to be included in a feature's interface to support compositional reasoning, and devising techniques to perform these checks. In previous work, we proposed a compositional verification methodology for features that interacted only through sequential transfer of control. The email application involves richer interactions. This section describes our previous model and methodology (for features as closed systems). Section 5 motivates and describes our enriched model and methodology through the email application.
Modeling features and their compositions
Our formal model of feature-oriented systems views each feature as a single state machine. Our previous work (Fisler and Krishnamurthi, 2001) shows how to reduce models where each feature has multiple state machines to the single-machine model. Hence we adopt the single-machine model here for simplicity. • S is a set of states, • and are sets of input and output atomic propositions, We expect features in pipe-and-filter product-line systems to compose in a chain, where the chain begins and ends with some basic infrastructure that is common to all products within the family (such as basic mail delivery, in the email case study). A composition of features and the base infrastructure forms a product, where a product consists of both a state machine and a set of interfaces where new features may be inserted into the system. We capture the common infrastructure in a base product, which is like a core feature. When we verify individual features, we must do so within the context of the base product so that we can establish properties of the feature relative to the common infrastructure.
Definition 3.
Abase product is a state machine (S, , , s 0 , R, T r, Fa) with an interface {s outgoing }, S connect where
• R contains an edge from s outgoing to each state in S connect (this represents the system with no features).
Definition 4.
A feature is a state machine M = (S, , , s 0 , R, T r, Fa) with an interface {s incoming }, S exit , R exit where
• s incoming ∈ S is the initial state for the feature, • S exit ⊆ S is the set of exit states; these states must have out-degree 0.
• R exit ⊆ S exit × P L( ) × 2 × 2 specifies constraints on edges from exit states to states in the eventual composed system. The last two arguments in each tuple specify true and false sets of propositions on the states to which these edges are expected to connect when integrating the feature into a product.
Our model builds up products by iteratively composing new features into products. In this framework, adding a feature to a product yields another product. We could define compositions of features into new features, but do not present those details here to simplify the presentation. The extension to feature compositions outside the context of products is, however, straightforward.
In order to connect a feature to a product, we need to match up the states in S connect of the base system with the specifications in the partial transitions from the states in S exit in the feature; if a state has no labels, we view it as satisfying all specifications. Intuitively, we will add an edge from a state in S exit to each state in S connect that satisfies the specification on the true and false propositions given in R exit from the exit state. The following two definitions make this precise.
Definition 5. Let e 1 and e 2 be states in (possibly different) features. e 1 and e 2 unify if T r(e 1 ) = T r(e 2 ) and Fa(e 1 ) = Fa(e 2 ) (i.e., if both states agree on their true and false labels), or if T r(e i ) and Fa(e i ) are both empty (for i ∈ {1, 2}).
Definition 6. Let P be a product with state machine (S P , P , P , s 0 , R P , T r P , Fa P ) and interfaces
except all edges between the interface states S outgoing i and S connect i from R P . R new contains the following edges: -All (s, pl, s ) such that there exists (s, pl, s ) ∈ R P such that s ∈ S outgoing , s ∈ S connect , s ∈ S incoming and s and s unify.
• Tr C = Tr P ∪ Tr F , and
The interfaces of P C is the set of interfaces from P except S outgoing i , S connect i and augmented with two new interfaces: Figure 2 illustrates these definitions more intuitively. The figure shows a product consisting of a base product and two features F 1 and F 3 , and the composition of feature F 2 onto this product (after F 1 ). The composition is performed via an interface {s 1 , s 2 }, {s 6 } . The interface on F 2 is {s 3 }, {s 4 , s 5 }, ∅ . Composition removes the dashed edges and adds the four edges that connect F 2 to the product. The italic labels b 1 , b 2 , m and d on the states of F 3 and the base product capture the idea behind states unifying on composition. When F 3 was composed with the base product, edges connected the states from F 3 to the base based on matching up the labels.
The core verification methodology
Our verification methodology entails three tasks:
1. Proving a CTL property of an individual feature through model checking (the verification step). 2. Automatically deriving preservation constraints on the interface states of features and products that help detect feature interactions compositionally. 3. Checking whether a feature F and a product P satisfy one another's preservation constraints at composition time (the preservation step). We establish preservation by analyzing at most F or P individually, not the composition of F and P.
We derive the preservation constraints during the verification step using (a variant of) CTL model checking. The standard CTL algorithm works by labeling all states with subformulas of the property to be verified. When we verify a property against a feature (in the verification step), the interface states are labeled with some of these subformulas. During the preservation step, we must check whether the overall product violates any of these labels. We therefore store these labels in the interface and check whether they still hold during preservation checks. More formally, the verification step operates as follows:
Verification step, version 1: Let F be a feature with interface I and B be the base product for the product-line that can contain F. Let ϕ be a CTL property to prove against F. Compose F and B via I into an product F (see Definition 6). Use CTL model checking to verify ϕ in the initial (incoming) state from F .
The formal model of features and their compositions from Section 4.1 is constructive, in that it captures the details needed to define and compose products and features. The verification step suggests that interfaces also have an analytic component, where we store data required for compositional verification. A refined notion of interfaces therefore accompanies each version of the verification step.
Definition 7 ( Interfaces, version 1). Each interface I of a feature or a product contains a mapping from states in the interface to a set of CTL properties (the labels placed on those states during the verification step).
We give an intuitive description of the preservation step by referring to figure 2. When we compose F 2 into the rest of the product (containing the base, F 1 , and F 3 ), we will need to perform two sets of checks: first, that the labels on s 4 and s 5 of F 2 hold once those states transition to F 3 ; second, that the labels on s 1 and s 2 hold once those states transition to s 3 . We perform each set of checks by augmenting each of the feature and the product with dummy interface states from the other, assuming certain labels on the dummy states, and verifying the remaining labels on the dummy states through model checking. The following description formalizes this intuition.
Preservation step, version 1: Let F be a feature with interface I F and P be a product. Let I P be the interface of P through which we intend to compose F and P. The algorithm checks for two possible sources of interactions: Report an error iff one of these verification fails. 2. (Prove that F doesn't interfere with properties within P) We must check whether the labels stored on states in S outgoing of I P still hold once F is connected to P. Add one dummy state to F for each state in the interface I P and insert edges between F and the dummy states that match those added when composing F with P. Copy the labels from S connect to their respective dummy states (which are reachable from F) and copy the propositional labels from states in S outgoing to their respective dummy states (which reach F). For each formula ϕ that labels a state s in S outgoing , model check the formula in the dummy state corresponding to s. Report an error iff one of these verifications fails.
Although the preservation step may appear expensive, in practice we rarely need model checking to confirm that P preserves the properties of F. Most labels on the exit states of F are simple labels such as "the mail state is reachable", i.e., they refer explicitly to reachability conditions on the states in the base product. In this case, we can simply check these reachability constraints once when composing a feature into the system, thereby amortizing these checks across multiple product compositions.
The correctness of this approach to preservation follows from our earlier work (Fisler and Krishnamurthi, 2001 ). The rest of this paper will revise these core algorithms to handle issues that arise in the context of open systems.
Modeling and verifying features as open systems

Unknown propositions
Using the preservation check on property 4 in the forwarding feature as an example, Section 3 motivated the need to treat features as open systems: to perform this check, we must add the encrypted proposition to the forwarding feature. This proposition captures a data attribute of a mail message that forwarding preserves as it processes the message. Our algorithm cannot assume a concrete truth value for this proposition and remain sound; instead, we must treat this proposition as having unknown value during the check. As 2-valued model checkers treat values as explicitly true or false, we instead need a 3-valued model checker. We used Bruns and Godefroid's 3-valued model checking algorithm (Bruns and Godefroid, 2000) in this paper; Chechik et al. (2001) In a 3-valued model checker, interpretations of the logical operators extend to unknown values in a straightforward manner. A 3-valued model checker can return true, false, or unknown as the value of a property in a structure. From a verification perspective, the unknown result is less useful than a true or false result. Techniques for determining concrete truth values in the presence of unknowns are therefore extremely useful. When no proposition maps to unknown in any state, 3-valued model checking reduces to 2-valued model checking and returns either true or false; models with no unknowns are called complete. Bruns and Godefroid's algorithm checks each property in two complete models: one in which all unknowns are replaced with true (the optimistic model) and one in which all unknowns are replaced with false (the pessimistic model). A property is guaranteed to be false if it evaluates to false in the optimistic model, and guaranteed to be true if it evaluates to true in the pessimistic model (Bruns and Godefroid, 2000) . If neither of these guarantees hold, their algorithm reports the property as having unknown value.
Figures 3 through 5 illustrate verification of the forwarding feature under each of the regular, optimistic, and pessimistic interpretations (the "normalized form" in the figures rewrite all formulas without universal temporal operators). The regular check, shown in figure 3, shows the property holding. This is unsound because decrypt-successful is assumed false, but if were true the path to the mail state would violate the property. This examples therefore requires the pessimistic and optimistic checks. Since the optimistic check returns true and the pessimistic one false, there exist paths that both preserve and violate the property. The verification step for this feature would therefore be inconclusive.
Our methodology could treat all propositions that arise in the property but are not in the model as unknown during preservation checks, but that is too conservative. Consider property 2, which refers to proposition wantsRemail. This proposition does not capture a data attribute of a message. Rather, it is a control proposition: it determines control-flow within a feature. Control propositions of one feature are never true in another feature because features do not execute simultaneously. This lets us set the control propositions from other features to false during model checking, which increases the likelihood of a concrete result from the model checker. Thus, when the designer can partition the propositions into control and data subsets, our technique can exploit this design information.
Given this distinction, we reduce feature-oriented verification to 3-valued model checking as follows:
Verification step, version 2: Let F be a feature and ϕ a property to prove of F. For each proposition p that is in ϕ but not in the labeling functions of F, set p to false in all states of F if p is a control proposition; otherwise set p to unknown in all states. Use 3-valued model checking to verify the property against the augmented state machine. Store the labels arising from the pessimistic and optimistic checks separately in F's interface.
Definition 8 (Interfaces, version 2). Each interface I of a feature or a product contains:
• A set of propositions from the product or feature which correspond to control propositions. • A mapping from states in the interface to a set of CTL properties true during the optimistic check.
• A mapping from states in the interface to a set of CTL properties true during the pessimistic check.
We must enhance the preservation step in accordance with our use of 3-valued model checking in the verification step. When using 2-valued model checking, preservation checks confirm that true properties remain true upon composition. In a 3-valued setting, the preservation step uses two sets of checks: one with the optimistic labels (which will detect property violations) and one with the pessimistic labels (which could confirm property preservation). If neither the optimistic nor pessimistic checks result in concrete answers, we must analyze the property against the composed system to determine its status in the composed system. Within the limits of our case study, however, the optimistic and pessimistic checks were always sufficient. 
Preservation step, version 2:
The preservation step proceeds as in version 1, with two modifications. For each property label ϕ to be checked:
1. For each proposition p in ϕ but not in the model being checked, set p to false (if a control proposition) or unknown (if a data proposition) in all states of the model. 2. Run the preservation algorithm twice: once copying the pessimistic labels, and once copying the optimistic labels. If the property fails under the optimistic labels, report an error. If the property holds under the pessimistic labels, report the property as preserved.
Evolving propositions
Propositions with unknown values enable the preservation checks required in featureoriented verification, but are insufficient to enable compositional feature verification. Compositional verification requires that once we verify a property of a feature, we should not need to traverse that feature again during the preservation checks for that property. Feature-oriented systems sometimes require the interpretation of propositions to evolve Figure 6 . The remail feature.
upon composition; this in turn complicates compositional reasoning. The key point of this section is that open systems arise not only from abstraction and decomposition (the conventional contexts for open system verification research), but also from system evolution. Consider property 2, which says that messages passing through the anonymizing remailer cannot reveal information that identifies the sender. How is anonymous defined in this property? From the perspective of the remailer feature alone (figure 6), anonymous is the same as the proposition remail-anonymize from the remailer. Once we add the signing feature, however, a message also needs to be unsigned in order to be considered anonymous. In other words, adding the signing feature changes the property statement from
How can we verify this property against the remail feature compositionally, when the property might change in unexpected ways upon composition?
We present the approach intuitively before providing the formal details. In our concrete example, evolution logically strengthened anonymous: we replaced remail-anonymize with remail-anonymize ∧¬signed. We can reasonably expect the evolution of propositions to logically strengthen or weaken their previous interpretations (otherwise, one feature would completely override another, which lies outside the scope of our current model). Strengthening and weakening are defined as follows:
Definition 9. Let expr and expr be boolean expressions. expr strengthens expr if expr ≡ expr ∧ augment, and expr weakens expr if expr ≡ expr ∨ augment, for some expression augment.
Suppose we had verified the original property in the remail feature, then needed a preservation check for this property in the signing feature. What labels would we copy from the remail feature to the dummy states of the signing feature? Since the sign feature changes the property, we cannot assume that the labels from the original verification remain valid. When propositions evolve, therefore, our technique from the previous section is not applicable.
Assume for the moment that we had anticipated that a future feature might place additional restrictions on (i.e., strengthen) anonymity. We could have verified the property AG (wantsRemail → A[(remail-anonymize ∧ augment) R ¬mail]) against the remail feature. The labels stored in remail for a preservation check would therefore be valid for any extension that strengthened the definition of anonymity. To verify the formula containing augment against the remail feature, however, would require 3-valued model checking since the interpretation of augment is unknown inside the remailer (by construction). This example outlines our proposed methodology for handling evolving propositions. We will verify properties under the assumption that certain propositions may be strengthened or weakened, then use the labels arising from those assumptions to perform preservation checks. While this approach will not let us perform all composition checks compositionally, it should let us perform many checks in that manner.
This proposal raises several concerns. Does a user need to know all the features and propositions before beginning verification? No, our technique is designed to support design evolution, including the addition of unexpected features. If an extension re-interprets a proposition that the designer had not expected to evolve, some existing features may need to be re-verified. Does failure of an augmented property in the verification step yield useful feedback? Our algorithm actually verifies each property in both its original and augmented forms to help identify the actual conditions under which a property fails. Wouldn't multiple augmented propositions in one property greatly reduce the likelihood of meaningful verification results? Yes, but we have not seen that case frequently in practice; furthermore, our approach is analogous to Bruns and Godefroid's optimistic and pessimistic interpretations on this point. In short, we believe the full algorithm, which we now present, adequately addresses these concerns within the limits of software engineering practice.
Both the verification step and the preservation step must change to handle evolving propositions. First, we need to distinguish between propositions whose interpretations may evolve (henceforth called evolving propositions) and those whose interpretation will remain fixed. We leave this distinction to the modeler; the method remains sound as long as the set of evolving propositions is over-approximated.
We extend the model checker with an additional input, an interpretation function R from evolving propositions to boolean expressions over non-evolving propositions: we use notations M, s, R |= ϕ and M, s, R |= ϕ to denote properties being true and false (respectively) in this extended model checker (we do not use a particular notation for a model check returning unknown). When the model checker encounters an evolving proposition p, it evaluates R( p); non-evolving propositions are evaluated directly. We lift the definition of strengthening and weakening to interpretations, then present revised verification and preservation steps.
If R 2 strengthens R 1 and R 2 ( p) = R 1 ( p) for any proposition p, then we say that R 2 strictly strengthens R 1 . We define weakens and strictly weakens at the level of interpretations analogously.
Verification step, version 3: Given a property ϕ to verify of a feature F under an interpretation R, perform version 2 of the verification step three times, each under a different interpretation: Each of the different interpretations gives rise to different sets of labels during the verification step. The interfaces must expand to store all of these labels accordingly, as well as the core interpretation that was in effect when the properties were verified.
Definition 11 (Interfaces, version 3). Each interface I of a feature or a product contains:
• The control propositions of the product or feature.
• A mapping from states in the interface to a set of CTL properties true during the optimistic check.
• A mapping from states in the interface to a set of CTL properties true during the optimistic strengthened check.
• A mapping from states in the interface to a set of CTL properties true during the pessimistic strengthened check.
• A mapping from states in the interface to a set of CTL properties true during the optimistic weakened check.
• A mapping from states in the interface to a set of CTL properties true during the pessimistic weakened check.
Although these interfaces appear to be getting rather complex, it is important to remember that a designer need supply only the constructive interface and the partition into control and data propositions. All of the labels are generated and stored automatically. In addition, the sets of labels and the labels themselves will tend to be small, so the space overhead is not as severe as Definition 11 might suggest.
2 Figure 7 shows an example of the interfaces generated to handle strengthening and weakening.
In order to complete our formal model, each product and feature must contain an interpretation of its evolving propositions. In the case of a product, this interpretation evolves as additional features are added to the product. To formalize this notion, we must define the composition of interpretations. When composing interpretations, the values from features override those from products, regardless of whether the feature strengthens or weakens the interpretation in the product. This may seem counterintuitive: a better strategy appears to be to keep the stronger interpretation in the composition. Such an interpretation, however, would not allow adding a feature to weaken an interpretation within a product. This situation arises in the case of anonymous being weakened to anonymous ∨ signed. It would make no sense to lose this more general interpretation in the overall product, especially since the new interpretation arises from a composition of features. Having the feature's interpretation override conflicts in the product captures the idea that products evolve in accordance with their feature sets.
Definition 12. Let F and P be a feature and a product to compose. Let R F be the interpretation associated with F and R P be the interpretation associated with P. For all propositions p in the domain of both R P and R F , assume R F ( p) either strengthens or weakens R P ( p). We define the composition R C of R F and R P to be an interpretation where
• For all propositions in the domain of R P but not in the domain of
R C is undefined if there exists a proposition p such that R F ( p) neither strengthens nor weakens R P ( p) (this definition allows R F ( p) = R P ( p) since strengthening and weakening can be vacuously satisfied with augment values of true and false, respectively). Naturally, the preservation step must also account for strengthening and weakening. Version 2 of the preservation step performs checks in two directions: one analyzing labels of the product against the feature and one analyzing labels of the feature against the product. We parameterize the following definition of the preservation step over the one being analyzed and the one whose labels are being confirmed, with their respective interpretations, the interpretation R A of the one being analyzed and the interpretation R C of the one whose labels are being confirmed.
Preservation step, version 3:
For each check in version 2 of the preservation step, let ϕ be the label being confirmed, A be the feature/product being analyzed and let C be the feature/product whose labels are being confirmed. Let R A and R C be the interpretations of A and C, respectively. Choose the labels to copy to the interface states according to the following algorithm:
-If the optimistic strengthened labels map to false (indicating that the optimistic strengthened check failed), report an error.
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-Otherwise, perform version 2 of the preservation step using the strengthened versions of the (optimistic and pessimistic) labels. If version 2 reports a concrete answer, return it.
• If R A ( p) weakens R C ( p) for all evolving propositions p in ϕ,
-If the optimistic weakened labels map to false (indicating that the optimistic weakened check failed), report an error. -Otherwise, perform version 2 of the preservation step using the weakened versions of the (optimistic and pessimistic) labels. If version 2 reports a concrete answer, return it.
• If R A ( p) is logically equivalent to R C ( p) for all evolving propositions p in ϕ, follow version 2 of the preservation step with the regular (non-strengthened or weakened) labels. (Note: if the two interpretations are logically equivalent, this algorithm would first attempt the strengthened and weakened tests, performing this check only if neither of those produced a concrete answer. For efficiency, we could modify the conditions for strengthened and weakened tests to require at least one proposition to strictly strengthen or weaken; this would not affect our soundness theorems.) • In all other cases, or if none of the previous cases yields a concrete answer, re-verify ϕ against C using R A , then apply version 2 of the preservation algorithm (with the new labels) to check preservation in A.
Soundness
The soundness of this methodology arises from a combination of the soundness of the methodology for verifying features as closed systems, the soundness of Bruns and Godefroid's 3-valued checking with optimistic and pessimistic interpretations, and the logic of strengthening and weakening. Our methodology is not complete due to a combination of our use of 3-valued logic and strengthening and weakening interpretations. Intuitively, our soundness theorems state that if the compositional methodology reports a particular property label as being true or false at a state, then model checking the same property on the corresponding state of the composed system would yield the same result. Our soundness results do not make claims about cases where the compositional methodology yields unknown as the result of a verification. We present the argument as two separate theorems, one concerning labels on states from the feature, and the other concerning labels on states from the product.
Our soundness proofs rely on an argument about the soundness of preservation checks. We perform preservation checks by attaching dummy states to a state machine; these dummy states represent the interface states to which the state machine will be connected during composition. We copy property labels from the interface to these dummy states, and verify properties in this augment state machine. Intuitively, we claim that any property that labels a state in the augmented machine also labels the corresponding state in the composed machine.
We claim that the labels on the states of the fragment and the dummy initial state are identical to those that would appear had we verified the property against a composed system. This claim is valid because state labels are determined by the labels of their successors in CTL model checking, and composition does not add paths from the end of a fragment back to its initial state. The following lemma formalizes this argument.
Lemma 1 (The preservation lemma). Let M be a state machine that will be composed with state machine S via interface I . Let M be M augmented with a dummy state for each state in I , with edges between states of M and the new states in M determined by the definition of composition (Definition 6). For all dummy interface states that serve as sinks of M , copy all labels from the corresponding states in I to the states of M ; for dummy interface states that serve as sources of M , copy all propositional labels from the corresponding states in I to the states of M . Let s be any state in M and let ϕ be a CTL property. Model checking ϕ at state s in M returns the same value as model checking ϕ at the state corresponding to s in the composition of M and S.
Proof: This lemma follows from the definition of CTL model checking. CTL model checking determines the labels on a state from the labels of its successor states. Thus, the lemma holds as long as composing M and S cannot affect the labels on the sink interface states. The labels on the sink interface states can only change if composition changes the set of states reachable from the interface states. Since our composition model prohibits edges that create new cycles at composition time, the labels on the sink interface states must be preserved upon composition. The lemma therefore holds.
Our results also depend on Bruns and Godefroid's theorems that any formula that is true under the pessimistic interpretation is true in the full model and any formula that is false under the optimistic interpretation is false in a full model (Bruns and Godefroid, 2000 Proof: Interpretations affect model checking only at the level of propositions because interpretations map propositions to boolean expressions over other propositions. It is therefore sufficient for us to argue that the theorem holds for all propositional formulas; the inductive definition of CTL model checking naturally lifts this result to properties in all of CTL.
The propositional proof breaks into several cases:
• Assume ϕ is a proposition p. If p is not an evolving proposition, then the theorem holds because the value of p at s is determined by the state labeling in S and is not affected by R 1 or R 2 . If p is an evolving proposition, then its truth value at s is that of the expression that p maps to under the corresponding interpretation. We therefore need to consider the relationship between R 1 ( p) and R 2 ( p).
, then the strengthening model check will check R 1 ( p) ∧ augment p while the regular model check will confirm R 1 ( p). If R 1 ( p) is false, then both the regular and strengthening model checks will return false for p at s. If R 1 ( p) is not false (unknown or true), then since augment p has value unknown by definition, the strengthening check will return unknown while the regular check will return R 1 ( p). In both cases, the theorem holds.
• Otherwise, R 2 ( p) = R 1 ( p) ∧ augment p . In this case, the strengthening model check used R 1 ( p) ∧ augment p in place of p. This is equivalent to R 2 ( p) up to renaming between augment and augment p . Since these variables are logically equivalent (interpreted as unknown), the result of model checking both expressions on s is equivalent. The theorem therefore holds in this case.
The only case in which the two model checks did not return the same result was when Proof: This follows trivially from the definition of R C , since R C ( p) = R F ( p) for all propositions p in the domain of R F .
Lemma 5. Let R F and R P be interpretations and let R C be the composition of R F and R P . If R F strengthens (resp. weakens) R P for all propositions in the domain of both R F and R P , then R C strengthens (resp. weakens) R P for all propositions in the domain of R P .
Proof: By Lemma 4, R C strengthens (weakens) R F for all propositions in the domain of R F . R C therefore strengthens (weakens) R P for all propositions in the domain of both R F and R P by transitivity. For all propositions p in the domain of R P and not in the domain of R F , R C ( p) = R P ( p), so the result holds trivially.
We now present the main soundness result as two separate theorems. Version 1 of the preservation step consists of two main subparts: one for determining whether the product interferes with the properties of the feature, and one for determining whether the feature interferes with the properties of the product. We handle each case in a separate soundness theorem. Theorem 1. Let P be a product and F be a feature. Let P C be the composition of P and F via interface I = S outgoing , S connect . Let s f be a state in S incoming of F and let ϕ be a CTL formula that labels s f (in one of the various sets of interface labels). Let R F be the interpretation in use when ϕ was verified against F. Let R P be the interpretation for P and let R C be the composition of R F and R P . If the preservation step reports that ϕ is preserved when composing P and F via I (i.e. that P does not interfere with properties of F-part 1 of the preservation step, version 1), then P C , s f , R C |= ϕ. If the preservation step reports that ϕ is violated when composing P and F via I , then P C , s f , R C |= ϕ.
Proof: By Definition 12, R P neither strengthens nor weakens R F . Two cases therefore exist:
• R P and R F are logically equivalent on all propositions in ϕ. According to the preservation step algorithm (version 3), we use the non-strengthened or weakened labels and apply version 2 of the preservation step. Version 2 reports ϕ as holding (failing) if it holds (fails) in the pessimistic (optimistic) interpretations. Our theorem therefore reduces to the soundness of using pessimistic (optimistic) models to determine truth (falsehood) in a 3-valued model. Bruns and Godefroid's theorem establishes this soundness.
• The previous case did not hold, in which case we re-verify P using R F and then use version 2 of the preservation step to check ϕ. Following reverification, this case reduces to the previous one, in which R P and R F are logically equivalent on all propositions in ϕ. By the preservation lemma (Lemma 1), the theorem holds for s p if every label on every state s i in S incoming of F during the preservation check is a valid label on s i in P C . Another application of the preservation lemma reduces this to proving that all labels on states s e in S exit of F during the preservation step are still valid on s e in P C . We therefore consider the statement only for these states.
Let s e be a state in S exit and let ψ be a label on s e in F . We must prove that ψ labels s e in P C . As this theorem concerns the preservation step (version 3), the proof breaks into cases depending upon the relationship between R F and R P . In this theorem, F is the system being analyzed (called A in the preservation step) and P is the system being confirmed (called C in the preservation step).
• If R F strengthens R P for all evolving propositions in ψ and the optimistic strengthened labels map to false, then the algorithm reports that ψ does not hold in the composed system. The soundness of this step follows from the soundness of false results under optimistic models predicting false results in full 3-valued models. Bruns and Godefroid's theorem completes the proof in this case. A similar argument covers the case when the optimistic weakened labels map to false.
• Assume R F strengthens R P for all evolving propositions in ψ but the optimistic strengthened labels do not map to false. The algorithm performs version 2 of the preservation step using the strengthened versions of the labels. Assume version 2 reports that F , s e , R F |= ψ; by definition of the preservation step, this check used the pessimistic labels. Bruns and Godefroid's theorem therefore implies that F , s e , R F |= ψ using the regular 3-valued interpretation (neither optimistic nor pessimistic). The truth value of ψ at s e in P C depends on the labels copied to the dummy interface states that s e reaches in F . If we can argue that those labels remain valid on the actual interface states in P C , then this case of the soundness proof holds. By assumption, R F strengthens R P (Definition 12). Lemma 5 implies that R C strengthens R P for all propositions in ψ. Based on this relationship between R C and R P , Lemma 2 guarantees that for all properties φ and states s in P, P, s, R P |= ST φ ≤ P, s, R C |= φ (i.e. that a strengthening model check in P is no more precise than the corresponding regular model check in P). For each state s c in S connect , P, s c , R C |= φ implies P C , s c , R C |= φ since the set of states reachable from s c in P C is the same as the set of states reachable from P. This establishes this case of the theorem.
If the preservation algorithm reports ψ as failing based on the check in the optimistic model, the result holds by a similar line of reasoning (replacing uses of pessimistic with optimistic).
• Assume R F weakens R P for all evolving propositions in ψ but the optimistic weakened labels do not map to false. Then the proof follows that for the previous case, substituting the corresponding lemmas on weakened interpretations for those on strengthened interpretations.
• In the remaining cases (R P and R F are logically equivalent, or no prior case produces concrete results), the proofs are analogous to the proofs for these cases from Theorem 1.
Case study results
Our interfaces are only effective if they enable us to perform most preservation checks compositionally. To evaluate the effectiveness of our interfaces, we searched for feature interaction errors in the email application described in Section 2. We used the case study to determine
• whether our interfaces and methodology can detect the feature interaction errors compositionally, • the extent to which each aspect of our methodology (original feature-oriented model checking, 3-valued model checking, and evolving propositions) contributed to detecting actual interactions, and • whether interactions can be detected through combining small numbers of features.
Our experiments use a model checker that we built specifically for handling our featureoriented verification methodology. We do not present performance figures here in part because the state machines for these models are too small to generate meaningful performance figures, and because the emphasis in developing the model checker has been to support the methodology rather than provide high performance. Similarly, we don't provide a comparison against model checking the entire system because our intent is to validate our modular verification methodology; in general, the number of combinations of systems in a product line makes whole-system verification prohibitively expensive.
We manually extracted the ten properties described in Section 2 from the interactions that Hall reported in his study (Hall, 2000) . Hall detected twenty-six interactions, of which we detected sixteen. 4 Of Hall's remaining ten interactions, three were too simple to detect at our level of model (we would have had to artificially design a model to reflect the interactions, and the detection would have then been trivial). Two arose from properties that could be expressed in LTL, but not in CTL. One involved forking a message down two delivery paths, which really depends on features being modeled as alternating automata. Three interactions involved human concepts such as rudeness that didn't translate well into logical formulas. Finally, one required a remailer with different behavior than the one we had designed based on the remainder of the study.
Each of the properties from Section 2 held when verified against the feature that was mainly responsible for implementing it, but failed upon composition with other features.
5 Tables 1 and 2 summarize the feature interactions that we detected using our modeling and verification methodology. Each row describes the property (from Section 2) whose violation led to the undesired interaction, the (ordered) composition of features with which we detected the interaction, a description of the undesirable interaction, and a statement of which techniques detected the interaction. The values in the table for the last column indicate one of three techniques: the original compositional methodology, 3-valued checks, and strengthened/weakened comparisons.
The tables show several results. First, seven of the sixteen interactions required only the original methodology. The remaining interactions required some combination of the enhancements. In general, using the original methodology in the context of unknown propositions is unsound because traditional (2-valued) model checking assumes that a proposition that doesn't appear in a feature is false. It is also unsound to reuse interface labels that were generated with the assumption that propositions do not evolve. These two nuances made our original methodology inappropriate for identifying the remaining nine interactions.
Our methodology detected the five interactions marked with "pessimistic strengthened" based solely on the information in the interfaces; no additional model checking runs were performed during the preservation step. In these cases, the verification step determined that strengthening the evolving propositions would lead to a violation of the property and recorded this fact in the interface. When the violation did occur, the model checker extracted the counter-example already stored in the interface.
We detected two interactions using evolving propositions sans 3-valued model checking; these are marked with "Original" in the techniques column and a non-empty ReInterpretation column. In these cases, the preservation step required model checking, but only for 2-valued logic. Finding the remaining two interactions required both 3-valued model checking and evolving propositions; in these cases, the information stored about weakening and strengthening was not enough to indicate a violation, so the preservation step ran the 3-valued model checker, using the extended interpretation listed in the table. In no case did we have to verify the full composition of the listed features in order to detect an interaction.
In nine of the sixteen interactions, the propositions evolved at composition time. In all of these cases, the new interpretations always either strictly strengthened or strictly weakened their earlier interpretations; because of our stored interface information in these cases, we never needed to re-verify a property already proven of a feature after re-interpretation. This clearly shows that any methodology for verifying feature-oriented designs must accommodate evolving propositions. The propositions do, fortunately, seem to evolve predictably, which verification techniques should exploit.
The distinction between control and data propositions was necessary to handle four of the interactions, specifically, the ones that violated properties 1 and 4. Each of these compositional checks would have failed if the control propositions had been interpreted as unknown, rather than as false, during model checking. This case study suggests that our enriched methodology is crucial for detecting many interactions. Our original technique could not find several of the feature interaction problems in this suite. In fact, our original modeling technique could not even model the suite accurately due to the lack of support for evolving propositions. This case study therefore demonstrates the utility and effectiveness of the results presented in this paper.
An Interesting Interaction
Property 4, which requires an encrypted message to never be decrypted and then mailed without first being re-encrypted, led to some interesting results during this study. The interactions arising from this property does not occur in our model with fewer than three features:
• The property holds of the encryption feature alone.
• The property holds when the decryption feature is composed with encryption because the decryption feature does not itself mail anything.
• The property holds when encryption is composed onto either autorespond or forward because the message stays encrypted until mailed.
• The property fails when autorespond or forward is composed with encryption followed by decryption because this composition introduces a path from a state where the message is clear (and stays clear) to mail. A 3-valued check exposes this.
• The property also fails when decryption follows either encryption and autorespond or encryption and forward. The proposition clear is weakened from false to false ∨ decryptsuccessful. A pessimistic weakened check on encrypt-autorespond or encrypt-forward exposes this.
This property differs from the others that yielded undesirable interactions because multiple orders of composition among the features expose the interaction; furthermore, different techniques (3-valued checks versus evolving propositions) exposed the interaction depending upon the composition order.
Perspective on verification
Identifying verification techniques that provide good support for feature-oriented verification is an interesting and important open problem. Both our previous work and the work reported here use model checking as the underlying verification technology. Model checking is a reasonable first choice: its automated nature allows us to prototype methodologies quickly and easily, and its low-level nature has forced us to identify fine-grained details about the feature interfaces needed to support compositional verification. Although model checking is not necessarily a natural choice for software verification, many research efforts are now exploring how well it applies to this domain. Our choice of model checking has clearly affected our models of features and their interfaces: in particular, interfaces would likely not associate labels with states were we not using state machine models and CTL model checking. Nonetheless, our experiences using model checking in the context encourage us to reflect on how viable model checking will be as a foundation for feature-oriented verification.
First, the amount of interface information that compositional model checking of features seems to require is an immediate concern. We currently store labels on several interface states for checks under both strengthening and weakening of evolving propositions. This information becomes less useful as the number of evolving propositions in a property increases. We also store partitions into control and data variables. Multi-actor features require even more interface information in the form of a subgraph, as explained in prior work (Fisler and Krishnamurthi, 2001) . Although the interface information has not proven excessive in this study, it could become so in a larger application that contains hundreds of features spanning multiple actors. Additional case studies are required to determine when the overhead of our interfaces outweighs the benefits of compositional feature verification.
Next, features interact implicitly through data. A viable model of feature interaction therefore must support modeling and reasoning about data. Model checkers' limitations in reasoning about data are well known: the main problem is the combinatorial explosion in propositions needed to encode data values as booleans. Many model checking efforts handle this problem through a combination of abstraction and cone-of-influence reduction. Given the deep co-mingling of control and data in both the models and properties of some feature-oriented systems, we are unsure whether these approaches will be useful in this context. In many cases, the design methodology inherently performs a partial abstraction because a feature only contains the propositions that are relevant to it.
We believe that the real problem lies in the need to arguably overspecify data in most statebased specifications. For data-intensive domains such as this one, declarative specifications (as employed by Alloy (Jackson, 2000) ) are likely more viable in the long term. Effective integration of declarative specifications into model checking or other feature-oriented verification techniques remains an open problem.
Finally, our work has heavily exploited the state-labeling algorithm of CTL model checking. It is unclear how to reformulate this work in the context of LTL, which operates at the level of full traces. This reopens the question of whether LTL is better suited to compositional reasoning (Vardi, 2001) . This departure reflects the difference in composition semantics between our work, which supports a form of sequential composition, and most compositional model checking, which supports parallel composition.
Other related work
Compositional verification has a long history dating back at least to Abadi and Lamport's work on assume-guarantee reasoning (Abadi and Lamport, 1995) . In this framework, a designer states manually-developed constraints (assumptions) on the behavior of a module as part of its interface; this framework was designed to support separate development of components. Proof rules govern when a composition of modules is valid according to the assumptions, and dictate when safety properties hold of a composition of modules. Pnueli (1984) , McMillan (1997) , and others have developed proof rules for compositional model checking; these frameworks capture module constraints through temporal logic formulas. These works, however, are really about decompositional verification, in which the whole system is available at the same time, but is verified piecewise for tractability. Having the whole system specification enables designers to derive assumptions about the behaviors of the surrounding system. Our modules, in contrast, are developed independently of their eventual deployment context. We can, nevertheless, exploit the sequential composition in our framework to automatically derive temporal logic interface constraints that must hold at composition time. de Alfaro and Henzinger capture interfaces through automata (de Alfaro and Henzinger, 2001 ) for parallel composition contexts.
Houdini infers annotations for modular checking in ESC/Java (Flanagan et al., 2001) . The framework infers candidate annotations through static analysis, then uses ESC/Java to check whether the annotations satisfy the program; if so, the annotations can become part of the program's interface. Our approach differs in several ways. First, we infer properties during individual feature verification. Second, our interfaces capture sufficient information to preserve properties upon composition; Houdini's annotations are not property-driven, and thus may not be useful for a given property. Finally, our approach is truly modular in that we do not require information about the modules we may compose with in order to derive our interfaces; Houdini requires some assumptions on the remainder of the program to perform its modular analysis.
Our case study uses modular model checking to detect certain feature interactions. Feature interaction problems have received substantial attention in the software engineering literature (Keck and Kuehn, 1998; Zave, 1997) . Our emphasis here is on modular verification, not on model checking as a tool for detecting feature interaction. Several researchers have attempted the latter in non-modular settings (Areces et al., 2000; Braithwaite and Atlee, 1994; Jackson and Zave, 1998; Keck and Kuehn, 1998 ). While we appreciate that model checking has limitations in detecting feature interaction, we believe our work enhances the options for using it when applicable in this domain.
Our email example uses a pipe-and-filter model of feature composition; this model resembles Zave and Jackson's Distributed Feature Composition (Jackson and Zave, 1998) . Our work differs because our full methodology supports features that span multiple actors; we do not cover multiple actors in this paper as they are orthogonal to our discussion of module interfaces. Our work also differs in that its focus is on verification rather than architecture and specification.
Other verification researchers have discussed methodologies for reasoning under sequential composition (Alur et al., 2000; Alur and Yannakakis, 1998; Clarke and Heinle, 2000; Laster and Grumberg, 1998) . These efforts differ from ours in many ways: none handle open systems, none were created towards supporting cross-cutting design methodologies, and all arise in a decompositional verification context rather than a modular design one. Our interfaces and verification methodology are designed to support modularity at the design level.
Conclusions
The automated verification of modern software systems requires effort in two directions. First, it must address the structure of modern software: as a third-party composition of independently-produced components that, increasingly, encapsulate software features (as in a product line). Second, it must realize that, even as this style of software could greatly benefit from sophisticated verification techniques, programmers are unwilling and sometimes even unable to write the specifications necessary for verification tools. Automatically synthesizing a suitable alternative to these specifications is a critical software engineering challenge.
The verification technique used in this paper is model checking, restricted to a modular context. Modular verification is critical in this domain for several reasons. Most important of all, there is usually no clear notion of a "whole" program, since independent fragments may be produced by several different developers. In addition, the sizes of whole programs can easily defeat the various techniques model checkers deploy to combat state explosion. This paper's contributions are twofold. First, it presents a series of definitions of interfaces that support modular verification in this component-based programming universe. The definitions grow to handle both the nature of the software itself, and the needs of the verification methodology. Second, it presents a study of verifying a suite of email features. Our technique identifies most of the feature-interaction problems previously found manually in this case study, thus validating the utility of our interfaces.
This work does suffer from the problem that a feature developer may not know which particular features to verify together to detect errors. This is not a problem for a client, who presumably handles only a particular composition (though dynamic loading does complicate this even at the client's end). Even a producer can, however, exploit our methodology to identify potential problems. As Section 6 showed, a failed pessimistic strengthened test stores a counter-example in the interface. Thus, any other feature that strengthens a feature's propositions is guaranteed to raise an error: the developer can detect this without even verifying the second feature. This (and, dually, optimistic weakening) should provide a useful diagnostic for a feature developer.
There are numerous directions for future work. Naturally, we need to conduct more case studies to identify other weaknesses in our interfaces. Second, we need experience with a broader user base to determine the true usability of our tools. More significantly, we intend to explore other kinds of verification tools, such as declarative specification solvers, that might better support the incomplete information that we currently model with 3-valued logic.
